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STATE STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION: A RE-EXAMINATION
OF THE PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Hurricane Agnes, the great storm that swept
through Pennsylvania in June 1972, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania brought an action against Thomas S. Kleppe, as
Administrator of the Small Business Administration (SBA), alleg-
ing that the classification of Pennsylvania as a low priority disas-
ter area resulted in a premature discontinuance of federal
relief.' The preliminary, and ultimately fatal, problem for Penn-
sylvania was establishing its standing to sue.2 The Common-
wealth argued that it had standing (1) on its own behalf, (2) as
parens patriae3 for all its citizens allegedly injured, and (3) as
parens patriae upon the relation of four named individuals. 4 In a
two to one decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of
' The Small Business Administration provided relief pursuant to the provisions of 15
U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 4451 (1970). See generally A. PARRIS, THE SMALL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (1968).
2 The standing requirement is rooted in article III, § 2 of the Constitution, providing
that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority .. " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
' Literally, "father of his country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1951).
The parens patriae function in English common law had its origin in feudal times. The
king acted as guardian of persons non sui juris-those legally incompetent to act for
themselves. Blackstone noted that
[u]pon the abolition of the court of wards, the care, which the crown was bound
to take as guardian of it's infant tenants, was totally extinguished in every feudal
view; but resulted to the king in his court of chancery, together with the general
protection of all other infants in the kingdom .... As to idiots and lunatics: the
king himself used formerly to commit the custody of them to proper commit-
tees, in every particular case; but now, to avoid solicitations . . . a warrant is
issued by the king .... The king as parens patriae has the general superinten-
dence of all charities ....
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 426-27.
4 Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485
(1976).
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Columbia rejected this argument in Pennsylvania v. Kleppe.5 The
court analyzed the Commonwealth's assertion in terms of the
alleged injury to its "proprietary interests"6 and to its "quasi-
sovereign interests"' 7 as parens patriae and rejected both. Using
principles of standing developed under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA)8 to determine whether the state could sue to
5 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
6 A state's proprietary interests have been defined as those arising from its own
contractual relationships as a direct consumer of goods and services. E.g., Alabama v.
Arizona, 291 U.S. 286 (1934). Proprietary interests also include the enforcement of
financial obligations owed to a state, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290 (1907),
and protection of its water or proper boundaries, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
A "quasi-sovereign" interest is an interest of the state qua state. It is not termed
"sovereign" because only the federal government is completely sovereign. See Malina &
Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L.
REv. 193, 202-03 (1970). That a state may bring a parens patriae suit to protect quasi-
sovereign interests was first recognized in Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
Louisiana sought to enjoin the governor and health officer of Texas from continuing to
prohibit commerce between New Orleans and Texas. Although it dismissed the case as
not within its original jurisdiction, the Court sustained Louisiana's standing as parens
patriae:
[The complaint's] gravamen is not a special and peculiar injury such as
would sustain an action by a private person, but the State of Louisiana pre-
sents herself in the attitude of parens patriae, trustee, guardian, or representa-
tive of all her citizens.
• . . [T]he cause of action must be regarded not as involving any in-
fringement of the powers of the State of Louisiana, or any special injury to
her property, but as asserting that the State is entitled to seek relief in this
way because the matters complained of affect her citizens at large.
Id. at 19.
The Court agreed that the government may seek redress when the general public
welfare was harmed and no individual had a legally cognizable injury. Louisiana's pos-
ture in the case was analogized to that of the United States in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895). The Court quoted from Debs:
[W]hile it is not the province of the Government to interfere in any mere
matter of private controversy between individuals, or to use its great powers to
enforce the rights of one against another, yet, whenever the wrongs com-
plained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters
which by the Constitution are intrusted to the Care of the Nation, and con-
cerning which the Nation owes the duty to all the citizens of securing to them
their common rights, then the mere fact that the Government has no
pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the
courts or prevent it from taking measures therein to fully discharge those con-
stitutional duties.
176 U.S. at 19.
8 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-76, 701-06 (1970), provides
that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judi-
cial review thereof." Id. § 702. To obtain judicial review of agency action under this
provision, a plaintiff must suffer injury in fact and assert an interest arguably within
the zone of interests protected by the statute. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See text accom-
panying notes 140-51 infra.
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vindicate a so-called "proprietary interest"-the- court found
the Commonwealth's property interest (loss of revenue due to
inadequacy of the SBA loans) to be too attenuated to support
standing. In rejecting the parens patriae basis for standing, the
court relied primarily upon Massachusetts v. Mellon9 in holding
that although the state may sue as parens patriae to protect its
"quasi-sovereign interests" in some circumstances, it cannot
stand as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens against the federal
government, the ultimate guardian of the citizenry.
Whether a state should be allowed to sue a component of
the federal government raises a number of doctrinal and practi-
cal considerations. Congress itself has retained no residual en-
forcement mechanism to insure that federal agencies comply
with its will. Instead, the right to challenge agency action is given
to parties who meet certain standing requirements embodied in
section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act which confers
standing upon a "person suffering legal wrong because of agen-
cy action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of the relevant statute."'' 3 This Comment
will examine whether a system of multiple enforcement" permits
suits by a state and will suggest that such suits are both legally
feasible and desirable. Through a combination of the principles
of standing developed in the administrative law context 2 and
the traditional state's right to sue as parens patriae, a flexible
and powerful basis for state suits can be found. To reach this
position, this Comment will first examine the traditional parens
patriae doctrine and then examine the wisdom and continued
viability of the Mellon rule as a bar to state suits against federal
agencies. Turning from parens patriae, the Comment next ex-
plores APA standing principles, and develops a synthesis of
those principles and the traditional parens patriae doctrine. The
Comment concludes by noting that state suits remain a viable
option notwithstanding the availability of class actions, in that
they preserve flexibility in allowing the states to protect signific-
ant interests, thereby increasing public confidence in both state
and federal government and creating a new dimension in
federal-state relations.
9 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
10 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
11 The possibility of multiple (public and private) enforcement of federal statutes
was recognized in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
12 See note 8 supra.
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II. THE PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
A. Traditional Requirements
The right to protect the interests of its citizens is an integral
part of the sovereignty of a state. The scope of this right, and the
circumstances in which it may be asserted, remain a subject of
controversy. State vindication of the rights of citizens was ex-
pressed in the English common law doctrine of parens patriae.
Originally a power of the Crown to assert the rights of subjects
who either lacked a legally cognizable injury or were legally
incapacitated,1 3 the parens patriae function was transferred to the
sovereign states in the United States, 14 again most typically to
allow state legal protection of legally incompetent individuals,
such as the insane,1 5 or to vindicate claims that no individual
could pursue.'
6
" Over time, the scope of appropriate claims for parens patriae
broadened in the United States to allow states to use the federal
judicial forum to protect those state interests sufficiently tied to
the general health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.' 7 Early
cases established that these quasi-sovereign interests included
protection of those natural resources vital to the state's own
economic and environmental well-being.' This economic link
retains vitality today,' 9 most notably in state parens patriae stand-
'3 E.g., In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 120-21, 145 P. 871, 872-73 (1915) (state as
parens patriae to a juvenile). For an historical overview of this role, see Malina & Blech-
man, supra note 7, at 197-202.
"4 Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S (17 How.) 369 (1854):
[W]hen this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown
devolved upon the people of the states. And this power still remains with
them, except so far as they have delegated a portion of it to the federal gov-
ernment .... The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.
Id. at 383-84.
1" Such protection, however, often meant the duty "to restrain and confine the
insane, not only for their own safety and protection, but for the safety and protection
of the public." Hammon v. Hill, 228 F. 999, 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
16 Hawaii v. Standard Oil of Calif., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972).
17 The Supreme Court has recognized the state interest in enjoining common law
nuisances and will extend its original jurisdiction to resolving interstate controversies of
this nature. The state also has an undeniable interest as a "quasi-sovereign" in those
resources within its boundaries. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922),
modified on other grounds, 353 U.S. 953 (1957) (state suit over diversion of water); New
York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921) (state suit to enjoin discharge of waste
where state was considered the proper party to represent and defend "[t]he health,
comfort, and prosperity" of its people); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (state
suit on behalf of its citizens to enjoin diversion of waters); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208 (1901) (state permitted to seek an injunction against the discharge of waste into
interstate waters).
"See cases cited in note 17 supra.
,' In Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973), for example, the
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ing to sue a private party for antitrust violations.2 0 But parens
patriae suits now extend farther, encompassing such noneco-
nomic and intangible interests as the elimination of race
discrimination.2 '
Shortly after the turn of the century, the Supreme Court
accepted a state's right to sue as parens patriae and to assert its
status qua state on behalf of the general welfare. The Court,
in Missouri v. Illinois,22 allowed one state to enjoin the discharge
of waste in another state, recognizing that "suits brought by indi-
viduals, each for personal injuries, threatened or received, would
be wholly inadequate and disproportionate remedies. '23 The
stricter requirement of the legal incapacity of an individual as
the sole justification for parens patriae was modified to permit
such suits to be grounded upon the practical inability of an in-
dividual litigant to secure relief.
State parens patriae suits were not allowed, however, when
courts found that the state was merely litigating the claims of a
select group. For example, in Kansas v. United States24 the state
was prevented from asserting the economic interest of a railroad
company as its own in attempting to have the land along a rail-
road in Indian territory declared as state land in trust for th e
railroad. The Court refused original jurisdiction,25 proclaiming
that the state was only a nominal party and that the real party in
state's interest in its costal waters and their marine life permitted it to sue as parens
patriae on behalf of its citizens to recover damages incurred from an oil spill. Whether
the state's interest was too speculative to be reduced to damages was held to be a matter
of proof rather than a question of standing.
20 See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); see text accompanying
notes 58-63 infra.
21 In Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 120
(3d Cir.), cert denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968), the state had standing to sue as parens patriae
to enjoin the trustees of a charitable school from excluding blacks. It had a "sufficient
interest in the elimination of discrimination for which it would be responsible to enable
it to maintain an action in federal court." Id. at 338. The court recognized that al-
though state law could not confer standing in federal court, the state attorney general's
duty, as parens patriae, to oversee the operation of charitable trusts was relevant to the
adequacy of the state interest for purposes of federal standing. Id.
22 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
2 3 Id. at 24 1.
24 204 U.S. 331 (1907).
25 Suits by one state against another, including those brought in parens patriae capac-
ity, are the most numerous class of suits heard by the Supreme Court in its original
jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not reach all cases in
which the state is a party. Despite the language of the second clause of article III, § 2,
original jurisdiction is conferred only where a state is a "party to a proceeding of judi-
cial cognizance." Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923). Suits by a state
against the citizens of another state are in the original, non-exclusive, jurisdiction of the
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (1970). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
ch. 13 (3d ed. 1976).
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interest was the railroad company which could pursue its own
claim.2 6 The line between the legitimate state parens patriae suit
and a suit in which the state is merely a nominal party acting in
the interests of proper parties is a difficult one to draw. States
cannot be assigned the claims of individuals in order to circum-
vent the doctrine of sovereign immunity as embodied in the
eleventh amendment, 27 nor can they voluntarily litigate a collec-
tion of private suits against another state for taxes withheld from
private parties.2 8 On the other hand, the presence of a suffi-
cently general public injury justifies the use of parens patriae
status.
These parens patriae suits, however uncertain in scope,29 re-
main a useful procedural form to assert a type of injury that is
substantively difficult to define and categorize. To ensure a
genuine state claim, rather than a camouflaged private claim,
two basic requirements are generally imposed. First, the state
must be acting on behalf of a substantial portion of its populace
as distinguished from a special interest group (the "substantial
numbers" requirement). Secondly, in addition to representing
such a general interest of the citizenry, the state must assert an
interest of its own, usually specified as quasi-sovereign but occa-
sionally said to include proprietary interests (the "independent
interest" requirement) .
3 0
The "substantial numbers" requirement dates from the early
twentieth century. In one case,3' Oklahoma was prevented from
attempting to restrain a carrier from charging unreasonable
rates within its jurisdiction because the Court found the state
was only protecting the rights of selected shippers rather than
fostering the growth of its communities and industries.32 Where
26 204 U.S. at 340.
2 " E.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (state could sue for injunc-
tion but not for damages on behalf of farmers who bore costs of litigation and had
agreed on pro rata shares in event of recovery).
28 Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (no sovereign or quasi-sovereign
interests of Pennsylvania were implicated in a suit to collect taxes exacted from Penn-
sylvania by New Jersey).
29 The Supreme Court, even while recognizing the validity of the parens patriae con-
cept, admitted as early as 1901 that it was unable "to anticipate by definition" the pre-
cise scope of the doctrine. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
30 The lack of clarity concerning the type of additional state interest that is neces-
sary is indicated by Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973). There,
the court declared that "the right of a State to sue as parens patriae is not limited to suits
to protect only its proprietary interests; a State also may maintain an action parens pat-
riae on behalf of its citizens to protect its so-called 'quasi-sovereign' interests." Id. at
1099-1100.
31 Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 220 U.S. 277 (1911).
32 Id. at 284-89. But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), in which
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consumers of natural gas constituted a substantial portion of the
state's population, however, the state could properly sue to en-
join commercial restraints on the flow of natural gas.
33
The requirement that a state cannot sue as parens patriae to
represent a limited interest attempts to insure that such suits are
for the general welfare of the state. The rule assumes that when
a sufficient number are affected, the state interest in the general
welfare is somehow triggered. But the "triggering point" is
neither delineated nor justified. The rule provides no workable
guidelines to insure representation of the general welfare.
Moreover, it distracts attention from the important question of
how the state itself has been harmed, regardless of the aggregate
number of individuals affected.3 4 The requirement thus fails to
distinguish adequately between the interests of a particular
group and the interests of a substantial number. It also fails
to conceptualize the public interest in a way that helps both the
states and the courts determine the propriety of a parens patriae
suit. The court in Kleppe, for example, noted the obscurity of
the meaning of this requirement because of the "substantial
interrelationship of all economic activity. '3 5 It conceded that
"even where the most direct injury is to a fairly narrow class of
persons, there is precedent for finding state standing on the
basis of substantial generalized economic effects."'
36
Even when the requisite general public interest exists, the
state must also allege injury to an interest of its own that is
the defendant-railroad company's alleged price-fixing activity, alleged to have discrimi-
nated against the state of Georgia, was considered detrimental to the public as a whole
and not just to particular shippers. See text accompanying notes 58-63 infra.
33 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
34 The failure to delineate clearly the "triggering point" is apparent in Oklahoma v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 220 U.S. 277, 289 (1911), in which the Court declared that the
state was merely seeking to "vindicate the wrongs of some of its people or to enforce its
own laws or public policy against wrongdoers, generally" in challenging the rates
charged by defendant-railcarrier. See Comment, The Original Jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REv. 665, 677 (1959), observing that:
the policy of looking to the number of persons directly affected in determining
the jurisdictional question is open to criticism. Analytically, whether suit is
permitted under the rubric of "proprietary" interests or parens patriae, the in-
jury to a state cannot be realistically separated from the injury to its citizens.
Whether jurisdiction will be taken in proprietary cases depends upon the ex-
tent of harm suffered by the state-in effect, the harm to the state's citizens
generally, and not upon whether specified individuals might also have been
directly affected. For this reason the parens patriae question should turn on the
extent of harm experienced by the entire state rather than the number of
persons that appear to be directly affected.
35 533 F.2d at 674.
36 Id. at 675 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
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somehow distinct from that of its citizens as individuals. 37 This
requirement was perhaps retained as a limitation on parens pat-
riae after the strict "legal incapacity" test was abandoned and
states were allowed to sue where individual suits would be inade-
quate as a practical matter. Moreover, the "separate interest"
requirement prevented states from litigating claims merely for
the benefit of an individual, thereby reinforcing the "substantial
numbers" requirement.
The prevention of public nuisances, an actual duty of the
state government, is a typical "independent interest" that would
satisfy this requirement. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,38 the
Court found that the state interest as parens patriae in preventing
the discharge of fumes from a neighboring state was "indepen-
dent of and behind the titles of its citizens. '39 Similarly, in Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia,40 the Court found commercial restraints
on the flow of natural gas a "matter of grave public concern in
which the State, as representative of the public, has an interest
apart from that of the individuals affected. '41 The "separate
interest" requirement was retained to prevent frivolous suits in
which the state had only a minimal interest.
The difficulties in drawing a distinction between the in-
terests of the citizens and the interests of the state bring this
rationale into question, however. Where injuries to a state's citi-
zens greatly affect their economic well-being, the state has also
suffered some sort of setback to its own productive capacity.
42
Even where the state demonstrates an interest of its own, the
distinction between proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests
and their relationship in parens patriae remains vague. In New
York v. United States43 the state had standing to challenge an
11 Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 394 (1938) (even where the
state asserted an economic interest in the claims of certain shareholders and declared
their enforcement to be a matter of state policy, the state lacked the requisite interest of
its own). The line between a purely vicarious interest and ah independent interest re-
mains unclear today.
38 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
39 Id. at 237.
40 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
41 The Court noted the extent of the threatened injury to demonstrate the gravity
of the request for relief. Id. at 592.
42 See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (state may sue as parens
patriae against a private party for injunctive relief for violation of the federal antitrust
laws); California v. United States, 180 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 826 (1950)
(California's duty to protect a resource with significant economic importance to the
public was grounds for the state's standing to intervene in a suit by the United States to
quiet title to certain waters being diverted for purposes of irrigation).
43 65 F. Supp. 856 (N.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 331 U.S. 284 (1947) (the Supreme Court
did not discuss the state standing issue and reviewed only the merits).
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approval of freight rate changes by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. In finding standing, the court asserted that any
distinction between the state suing as both parens patriae and as
shippers and consignees directly affected by the order "has be-
come more or less academic. 44 In addition to being shippers
themselves, all the states are:
political entities which are ... directly affected as such
and have an interest in behalf of their citizens and
communities above and apart from the rights of any
particular shipper. . . . [Such an interest] gives these
States standing to sue as parens patriae to preserve or
enhance the welfare of their citizens ...45
Thus, the court combines the supposedly distinct concepts of
proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests. When a single action
affects both the state and its citizens, a parens patriae claim is
permissible.46
The Kleppe court, in contrast, drew a clear dichotomy be-
tween proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests for purposes of
standing.47 The court found that a state's duties to protect its tax
revenues and to look after the well-being of its citizens were
proprietary interests. The alleged injuries were not directly al-
locable to particular individuals but rather involved the interests
of a state as an independent entity. Because the injury was to the
state as an independent entity, the court characterized it as an
injury to a proprietary interest and therefore not relevant to the
question of parens patriae standing. But this "independent entity"
notion reflects part of the test used in parens patriae cases alleging
injury to quasi-sovereign interests. The Kleppe court's characteri-
zation of the interest as proprietary-directly affecting the state
as a party-was followed by a rejection of standing because the
state was not arguably within the "zone of interests" of the Small
Business Act,4 8 the federal legislation in question.49 Such a result
41 Id. at 872.
45 Id.
46 The "proprietary'T'sovereign" distinction has been discarded in other contexts.
For example, in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1936), the Court
disregarded the distinction with reference to the state operation of its own railroad. In
this instance, regardless of whether it was exercising its power to operate its own rail-
road in a private or sovereign capacity, the state was subordinate to the power of the
national government to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 184. The distinction has
also been criticized in the area of municipal tort liability. See 3 K. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 25.07 at 459-66 (1958).
47 533 F.2d at 671.
48 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-51 (1970).
49 The court relied upon the principle enunciated in Association of Data Processing
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is anomalous; the court characterizes the interest alleged by the
state as not really on behalf of its citizens but rather on its own
behalf, but it then states that this is not a protected interest
because the Small Business Act is designed to help individual
citizens rather than the state qua state. The dismissal of the
proprietary interest claim is predetermined by the way the court
categorizes the state's interest so as to exclude it from protection
by the Act that Pennsylvania sought to enforce.
The confusion engendered by the parens patriae doctrine is
exemplified by Pennsylvania v. National Association of Flood In-
surers.511 In that case, the state asserted three distinct capacities
to sue the National Association of Flood Insurers for monetary
damages for failure to publicize in Pennsylvania the availabil-
ity of flood insurance prior to the floods in 1972 and 1973. 5
1
The court rejected each ground. It dismissed Pennsylvania's
''proprietary interest" claim as legally deficient for failure to state
a sum representing losses. Nor was the state permitted to assert
parens patriae standing, which the court defined as "a concept of
standing utilized to protect quasi-sovereign interests":
52
A "quasi-sovereign" interest must be an interest of the
State existing separate and apart from those injuries
suffered individually by the State's citizens. What must
be at stake is the State's independent interest, which
generally arises from either (1) the State itself having
suffered injury, such as direct damage to its economy or
(2) the general public having suffered an injury so that
no one individual has legal standing to sue. Under
either circumstance, the sine qua non for the State, which
sues in its parens patriae capacity, is that damage has
occurred to its interest apart from the interests of par-
ticular individuals who may have been affected.
53
The parens patriae claim was dismissed for failure to allege an
interest in citizens' claims. Pennsylvania could not maintain pa-
rens patriae status where it did not allege such an interest and
where it had not adequately alleged an injury to itself.
54
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), that parties arguably within the protection
of the statute at issue should be given standing to sue under the statute. See text ac-
companying notes 145-48 infra.
50 520 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975).
5" One of these capacities, that of subrogor, will not be discussed by the Comment.
See 520 F.2d at 15 n.4.
5 2 Id. at 21 n.25.
53 Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
54 Id. Confusion over what sort of independent state interest is necessary to support
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Whether a proprietary interest claim or a quasi-sovereign
interest claim, standing alone, would have been sufficient to
support standing is unclear. That the sine qua non of state stand-
ing is "an interest apart from the interests of particular
individuals"5 5 is an ambiguous statement. Did the court mean
that states should merely refrain from seeking redress on behalf
of the real parties in interest? Or is this statement to be read
literally as requiring that state sovereignty itself be significantly
threatened in order to justify the state's taking action? The
court's position seems contradictory. While requiring that a state
demonstrate an "interest . . , existing separate and apart from
those injuries suffered individually by the State's citizens," the
court does not recognize that the state may have precisely such
an "interest" in its citizens' claims.5 6 The ambiguity over the rela-
tionship between these two requirements accounts for the dis-
missal of the threshold question of standing. Courts cannot apply
a test that separates in theory certain interests which in reality
are intrinsically connected.
B. Parens Patriae in the Antitrust Context
The policy factors limiting the expansion of parens patriae
suits-such as the fear that the state lacks a sufficient interest of
its own, and the perception that the state should not litigate the
claims of private individuals-have undergone substantial analy-
sis in the area of antitrust litigation.5 7 An examination of the use
of parens patriae in the antitrust context reveals the advantages
and limitations of such suits in both theory and practice.
In antitrust cases, the concepts of proprietary and quasi-
sovereign interests are especially blended. The state is both a
direct consumer and a representative of its aggrieved citizens.
a parens patriae claim is apparent here, as it was in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963). There, the
court assumed, arguendo, that Illinois could represent its consumers as parens patriae to
challenge alleged price fixing of electrical equipment. But Illinois was not allowed to
intervene in any capacity on behalf of consumers where neither the state nor the con-
sumers had any direct pecuniary interest in the proceedings as required by rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The state had no right to intervene as parens
patriae where it could not have brought a direct action against the alleged antitrust
conspirators. Because the consumers were not directly and proximately affected by the
violation, the court would not countenance an action by them nor by the state on their
behalf.
520 F.2d at 22 (emphasis supplied).
56 Id. (emphasis supplied). The court found such an allegation missing in this case.
Id.
I 7 See generally Malina & Blechman, supra note 7; Note, Parens Patriae-Application
to Antitrust Situations, 15 ST. L.U.L. REV. 311 (1970); Annot., 23 A.L.R. FED. 878 (1975).
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Antitrust violations such as price-fixing can injure the state's in-
terest in either a proprietary or quasi-sovereign capacity. This
dual role was exemplified in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad.58 In
Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld a parens patriae claim for
injunctive relief against the railroad company where the alleged
antitrust violation, if proven, "limit[ed] the opportunities of
[Georgia's] people, shackle[d] her industries, retard[ed] her de-
velopment, and relegate[d] her to an inferior position among
her sister States." 59 The Court concluded that "these are mat-
ters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest
apart from that of particular individuals," 60 emphasizing the
idea of independent interest presented in Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co.
61
Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad also exemplified important
limitations on the parens patriae doctrine. The Georgia Court did
not sanction claims brought on behalf of individual consumers.
Rather, the state had to allege an injury independent of damages
to particular individuals.6 2 Georgia thus implies a state may not
sue solely on behalf of individual consumers to recover damages
for alleged antitrust violations, but must allege injury to a sever-
able state interest.
63
Moreover, the state's parens patriae role in antitrust litigation
was limited by the courts to the pursuit of injunctive relief under
section 16 of the Clayton Act64 rather than monetary relief under
58 324 U.S. 439 (1945). A recent case relying primarily on Georgia is Burch v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 420 F. Supp. 82 (D. Md. 1976). In that case, Maryland's
quasi-sovereign interest in its general economy was considered sufficient to support pa-
rens patriae standing to seek injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act against
alleged reciprocal dealing between a major tire company and an oil company.
59 324 U.S. at 451.
6 0 Id.
61 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); see text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
62 324 U.S. at 451, 520. See Malina & Blechman, supra note 7, at 214. Although
Georgia sought damages on behalf of certain private shippers, the Court did not rule
upon this claim and instead sanctioned Georgia's claims for injunctive relief based upon
its proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests.
63 Id. In at least one case brought after Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., the Court has
cited the availability of a private class action under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in partial justification for denying a parens patriae antitrust damage suit. See
Hawaii v. Standard Oil of Calif., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); see text accompanying notes
64-68 infra.
64 Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue
for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdic-
tion over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws, including sections 13,14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and
under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened
conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the
rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond
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section 4 of the Act.65 Although the Supreme Court, in Hawaii
v. Standard Oil of California,66 undertook an elaborate statutory
interpretation of sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act to justify
this limitation, the Court seemed most concerned by the under-
lying practical difficulty of assessing and then distributing dam-
ages and the possibility of duplicative recovery.67 Injunctive
relief under section 16 requires only an injury cognizable in
equity and would encompass an injury to a state's general econ-
omy as an invasion of a quasi-sovereign interest.
The recent passage of the Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976,68 which permits the state attorney general to seek treble
damages against violators of the federal antitrust laws as the
representative of the state's injured individuals, abolished the
judicial preference for limiting state claims to injunctive rather
than monetary relief. The new statute attests to the continued
vitality of the parens patriae doctrine and suggests certain charac-
teristics of parens patriae that aid in determining its appropriate
scope when a state seeks to sue a federal agency. First, the accep-
tance of parens patriae antitrust suits implicitly recognizes a state's
power to seek compliance with federal law. Secondly, such suits
demonstrate how the economic well-being of a large number of
citizens is tantamount to an even greater and independent state
interest for purposes of standing. Thirdly, from a practical
standpoint, the new statute recognizes that a parens patriae suit is
a useful and efficient means to assert the collective interests of a
against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that
the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunc-
tion may issue: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to
entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the United States,
to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject
to the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth,
eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, in respect of any matter subject to the
regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
65 Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
66 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
67 405 U.S. at 260-65. The Court expressed a preference for class actions over
parens patriae suits when the state is seeking damages for an antitrust violation. See text
accompanying notes 192-216 infra.
68 Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 208-16 infra.
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large number who are injured by the same action. 69 In the anti-
trust context, courts need not draw abstract and theoretical dis-
tinctions between so-called "proprietary" and "quasi-sovereign"
interests for purposes of state standing. When an antitrust vio-
lator inflicts injury upon a state's citizens, the new statute recog-
nizes that the state itself is sufficiently injured to justify a state
suit on behalf of its citizens. A parens patriae suit is no less ap-
propriate or desirable when a federal agency's action harms a
large number of the state's citizens; the state is similarly injured.
Developments in parens patriae antitrust litigation recognize
certain advantages of its procedural form that would also be
present in the Kleppe context. 70 A state may utilize its superior
legal and investigative resources in seeking appropriate relief.
A state is also likely to be better able to defray the costs of
litigation.
C. Some Tentative Observations About Parens Patriae
From their original purpose of vindicating the interests of
the legally incapacitated, to their use in enjoining public nui-
sances, to their use in the antitrust field, parens patriae suits have
remained flexible yet difficult to define. Despite this uncertainty,
some generalizations appear to be accurate.
Parens patriae suits must be for the benefit of a substantial
portion of the citizenry, and the state must assert an interest of
its own in addition to, though not totally removed from, those of
its citizens. The existence of this independent interest, whether
proprietary, quasi-sovereign, or an amalgam of both, reem-
phasizes that the state is not merely asserting the claims of pri-
vate individuals. 71 The precise nature of this independent in-
terest remains unclear.
19 For a comparison of the efficacy of a parens patriae suit with the class action, see
text accompanying notes 206-18 infra.
11 See generally Note, Wrongs Without a Remedy: The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for
Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 570 (1970). That commenta-
tor argues that governmental parens patriae suits provide the most effective remedy
for antitrust violations, given the practical difficulties in individual consumer suits
and in class actions.
Where a substantial number of citizens of the state are injured by the
[antitrust] violation, and where they all stand to obtain some recovery if the
parens patriae action is successful, then the state should be deemed substantially
identical to its citizens.
Id. at 593. The commentator suggests that a state suit on behalf of citizens is analogous
to a public interest organization or a civil rights group representing its members in
litigation. Id. at 592-93.
71 The requirement of an independent state interest will be significant in light of
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Allowing the independent interest sufficient to permit states
to assert parens patriae status to remain undefined is advanta-
geous, however, because flexibility is preserved. Courts should
not try to characterize a state's interest as either "proprietary" or
"cquasi-sovereign." Given the multifaceted nature of state duties
and obligations, a state's claim that its interests have been
injured should be analyzed on a case by case basis. As a result,
states may show that they possess an interest qua state that has
been infringed or threatened rather than having to conform to
pre-established judicial standards with respect to the requisite
state interest. The state would have the opportunity to demon-
strate how its interests are bound up in matters affecting its
citizenry and its own sovereign responsibility to them.
In cases like Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad and New York v.
United States mentioned earlier,72 the state's proprietary interest
was supplemental to its parens patriae status, and constituted that
necessary interest "independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens. ' 73 As political entities, the states in these cases were both
directly and derivatively affected by the defendants' actions.
Either interest was grounds for standing. In both cases, states
had standing to seek the proper administration of federal laws
affecting the well-being of its citizens.
7 4
Georgia and New York thus implicitly recognize the validity of
a state's interest in the proper administration of federal laws,
even where proper enforcement may be sought by other parties.
The question remains whether such an interest-neither exclu-
sively proprietary nor exclusively quasi-sovereign in the tradi-
tional sense-should permit a state to challenge the federal
government's administration of federal laws. If a state's interest
in the fair and impartial treatment of its citizens by federal agen-
cies is "independent of and behind their titles" as to give the
state standing to sue a federal agency, then the Kleppe court
might have been incorrect in its assertion that the state im-
the standing requirement under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1970), that the right of review exists for those "adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." See text accompanying notes
140-73 infra.
72 See text accompanying notes 43-46, 58-63 supra.
73 This phrase, which is frequently invoked in parens patriae cases, was originated by
Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
74 The court in New York, for example, noted that "[S]tates [have] standing to sue as
parens patriae to preserve or enhance the welfare of their citizens by securing to them
the proper administration of federal laws under the principles applied in Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R." 65 F. Supp. at 872 (citation omitted).
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properly sought to interfere with the SBA's implementation of
its statutory mandate. But before such a conclusion can be
drawn, the import of Massachusetts v. Mellon 75 must be consi-
dered.
III. THE STATE AS PARENS PATRIAE VIS k VIS
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: THE VALIDITY
OF THE MELLON DOCTRINE
Massachusetts v. Mellon7 6 remains the greatest obstacle to state
parens patriae suits against the federal government. Massachusetts
and a taxpayer had challenged the constitutionality of the Fed-
eral Maternity Act 77 which provided cooperating states with
funds to aid in reducing infant and maternal mortality. The state
asserted claims both as a party harmed by the statute and on
behalf of its citizens.
78
Massachusetts claimed that it had been injured as 'a
sovereign state because the Act invaded the state's local concerns
and usurped powers reserved to it by the tenth amendment.
79
The Court stated that it lacked jurisdiction over such claims on
the grounds that (a) the powers of the state had not been in-
vaded "since the statute impose[d] no obligation but simply
extend[ed] an option which the state [was] free to accept or
reject,180 and (b) the claims presented nonjusticiable political
questions.
81
The state's parens patriae claim on behalf of its citizens rested
upon the assertion that the Act infringed upon the rights of its
citizens to be free from the enforcement of unconstitutional
laws.8 The Court rejected the state's parens patriae basis for
standing:
We need not go so far as to say that a State may never
intervene by suit to protect its citizens against any form
of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress;
5 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
7 6 
Id.
7 Ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
78 The taxpayer's claim that the federal appropriation for the Act would result in
taxation for illegal purposes was rejected for lack of standing: the taxpayer neither
suffered nor was threatened by "direct injury." See 262 U.S. at 488.
79 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
80 262 U.S. at 480.
81 Id. at 483.
82 Id. at 479, 485.
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but we are clear that the right to do so does not arise
here. . . . [T]he citizens of Massachusetts are also citi-
zens of the United States. It cannot be conceded that a
State, as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings
to protect citizens of the United States from the opera-
tion of the statutes thereof. . . . [I]t is no part of [the
state's] duty or power to enforce [its citizens'] rights in
respect of their relations with the Federal Government.
In that field it is the United States, and not the State,
which represents them as parens patriae, when such rep-
resentation becomes appropriate, and to the former,
and not to the latter, they must look for such protective
measures as flow from that status.
83
Thus, the Court took a less than coherent view of the pro-
priety of a state parens patriae suit to prevent the federal
government's enforcement of unconstitutional acts: the Court
first acknowledged that such suits might be allowed in un-
specified circumstances, but then a few sentences later all but
foreclosed such suits by asserting that the United States repre-
sents a state's citizens as parens patriae against the federal gov-
ernment. Another ambiguity is that the Court's holding is li-
mited to barring state parens patriae suits against the federal
government's enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional laws,
although the language of the Court's opinion might be read to ex-
tend to all federal government activity, thereby denying a state a
parens patriae role in enforcing its citizens' rights "in respect of
their relations with the Federal Government.
8 4
Despite the uncertainty of its reach, Mellon nevertheless has
been invoked to prevent states from challenging federal agency
action. The Governor of Louisiana was prevented from enjoin-
ing the enforcement of a price ceiling on strawberries imposed
by the federal Price Administrator, despite alleging substantial
harm to a major Louisiana industry that directly affected the
state's economic well-being. 85 Also on Mellon's authority, a state
83 Id. at 485-86.
84 Id. at 486. A distinction between a state parens patriae suit challenging the right of
the government to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional law and a state parens patriae
suit alleging a federal agency's failure to properly fulfill its statutory mandate under a
concededly constitutional law may be crucial in cases like Kleppe in which states chal-
lenge federal agency action affecting their citizens rather than the constitutionality of
federal laws. See text accompanying notes 115-29 infra.
85 Jones ex rel. Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 707 (1944) (motion for leave to file
complaint denied for lack of jurisdiction). Compare Louisiana Dept. of Commerce &
Indus. v. Weinberger, 404 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. La. 1975), in which the state's interest in
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was precluded from seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating
a milk marketing order of the Secretary of Agriculture in Min-
nesota ex rel. Lord v. Benson.86 The state, through its attorney
general, claimed standing as a "party aggrieved or adversely af-
fected" by the Secretary's action and purported to represent its
citizens and the dairy industry as parens patriae. The court ap-
plied the Mellon rationale to challenges of federal administrative
action, notwithstanding that Mellon itself was a constitutional
challenge: "[T]he United States rather than Minnesota occupies
the relationship of parens patriae to those who are said here
to be adversely affected or aggrieved by this order issued by
the Secretary in his capacity as an official of the United States
acting under the authority of federal legislation.1
8 7
Lord seemed to treat a state's proprietary interest and its
parens patriae role as necessary complements for standing, rather
than as alternative bases of standing, declaring that "Minnesota
asserts no proprietary interest which is adversely affected, or any
impact of the order upon her apart from her position as parens
patriae. '' 88 The court refused to predicate standing solely upon
injury to an interest encompassed by parens patriae, although
such an injury generally would confer standing.
89
Although the Lord court read Mellon very broadly, other
courts have sought to confine it.9" Whatever sense Mellon made
in 1923, it is certainly open to attack today as being inconsistent
with the present scope of the federal-state relationship. That this
relationship is constantly changing was recognized by Woodrow
Wilson in 1908:
The question of the relation of the States to the federal
government is the cardinal question of our constitu-
tional system ... It cannot ... be settled by the opinion
of any one generation, because it is a question of
growth, and every successive state of our political and
economic development gives it a new aspect, makes it a
new question. 9 1
Mellon should not be allowed to control an area of federal-state
relations when that relationship has undergone fundamental
the well-being of the turtle industry was declared sufficient to support standing to chal-
lenge an HEW regulation of that industry.
86 274 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
87 Id. at 766.
88 Id. (emphasis supplied).
89 See note 17 supra.
90 See text accompanying notes 100-39 infra.
91 W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 173 (1908).
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change. Federal-state cooperation in, inter alia, crime control,
health, education, welfare, transportation, and conservation
measures has resulted in connections between those govern-
ments so numerous that "it [has] often proved impossible to
determine where the work of one beg[ins] and the other
end[s]. '' 92 State-federal consultation and cooperation have been
the basis of the growth of federal agencies.93 To say that the
state has no interest in the proper functioning of these govern-
mental organs is to ignore the role of the state itself in their
creation and administration.
An expansion of state-run functions with regard to social
legislation and welfare accompanied the growth of federal pro-
grams in the 1930's and 1940's. A commentator at that time
observed that:
[T]he new federal programs have had a noticeable ef-
fect on the legislative, administrative, and supervisory
activities of the states. Recently federal administrators
have allowed the states to exercise increased discre-
tionary power in policy decisions under grants-in-aid; in
other ways the so-called "subordination" of the states
has actually resulted in an increase in state authority.
94
The advent of Social Security programs and other social welfare
services brought about a fundamental transformation of the ad-
ministrative dualism of the Mellon era in which state and federal
governments operated in relative autonomy. As a result, a com-
plex network of formal and informal agreements concerning the
exchange of research, equipment, and personnel has evolved in
a myriad of federal offices. 95 Joint federal-state investigation into
92 J. CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM 35 (1938). State-federal cooperation in
the enforcement of legislative programs is often prescribed by statute. For example, the
cooperation of federal and state agencies in a comprehensive program of forest-land
management is established in the Clarke-McNary Reforestation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 567(a)
(1970). Similarly, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 authorizes federal
assistance payments to mortgagees holding mortgages under a state or local program.
12 U.S.C. § 1715z (Supp. V 1975) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1970)). The administra-
tion of the federal Food Stamp Program is carried out by state agencies which individu-
ally submit plans of operation for federal approval. 7 U.S.C. § 2019 (1970). Federal
funds for education are dispensed to the states following the approval of state plans by
the Commissioner of Education. 20 U.S.C. § 1231 (1970). Cooperation in the elimina-
tion of drug abuse is provided by 21 U.S.C. § 873 (1970). In the area of transportation,
the federal government provides assistance to state and local governments to finance
urban mass transportation systems. 49 U.S.C. § 1602 (1970).
9
3
See generally W. GRAVES, AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (1964); A.
MACMAHON, FEDERALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT (1955).
94 G. BENSON, THE NEW CENTRALIZATION 106 (1941).
95 See J. CLARK, supra note 92, at 81-108.
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the areas in which government intervention was most sorely
needed, such as in housing for the poor, generated the proposals
which became the basis of federal legislation. The states often
have a high degree of decision-making authority within the
framework of federal legislation.
96
With state participation so integral to the effectuation of
federal policies and programs, the states have a strong interest in
federal agencies' compliance with the statutes governing these
programs. Parens patriae is an appropriate capacity in which to
assert such an interest. Deeming a state to be "an aggrieved
party"97 when threatened by allegedly illegal agency action
adapts the parens patriae requirement of injury to a state interest
to the modern administrative law context, the primary source of
suits challenging the propriety of federal agency action. 98 The
state's interest in the proper administration of federal programs
in which it plays a role should qualify it for standing under both
the parens patriae doctrine and administrative law principles of
standing.99
The growth of federal programs has already worked
changes in the law of standing. Congress felt it important to
confer standing on parties aggrieved by agency action as an aid
in enforcing federal law and as a safeguard against abuses by the
growing federal bureaucracy."' The courts, too, have felt jus-
tified in expanding the class of permissible plaintiffs in suits
against federal agencies. As a result, courts have allowed a
number of suits that might otherwise have been barred by the
Mellon doctrine. 1
Indeed, Mellon's validity as a bar to state parens patriae suits
against the federal government generally, including suits alleg-
ing the unconstitutionality of an act, is questionable under exist-
ing case law. For example, in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Com-
mission,'10 2 the state's interest in the receipt of federal funds was
sufficiently compelling to permit standing to challenge the con-
6 For example, under § 401 of the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 601
(Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970), state participation in the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program is voluntary, and each state has the respon-
sibility of promulgating a plan for aid and services to needy families with children.
'7 See text accompanying notes 158-95 infra.
98
See text accompanying notes 140-51 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 158-65 infra.
Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act partly to meet this concern.
See text accompanying notes 140-41 infra.
" Text accompanying notes 102-35 infra.
162 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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stitutionality of the Hatch Act. 113 The Court expressly noted that
Oklahoma had a legal right in the grant-in-aid program allotting
federal highway funds to the state'0 4 that would be adversely
affected by the Civil Service Commission's withholding of federal
funds if the state failed to enforce a Commission order removing
a State Highway Commissioner from his office for engaging in
political activities proscribed by the Act.
The Court based its finding that the state could challenge
the constitutionality of the Hatch Act on a section of the same
Act conferring the right of judicial review upon any party ag-
grieved by a Civil Service Commission order. 10 5 The threat to
Oklahoma's legal right to receive federal highway funds created
a justiciable cause of action.' 0 6 Significantly, the Court noted, in
dicta, that "violation of such a statutory right normally creates a
justiciable cause of action even without a specific statutory au-
thorization for review."107
Relying upon Mellon, the Court might have held that
Oklahoma had no standing to question the agency action because
its receipt of the highway funds was purely voluntary. Instead,
the Court distinguished Mellon by noting that in Mellon, the en-
forcement of the Federal Maternity Act, unlike the enforcement
of the Hatch Act, placed no burden upon, nor infringed arty
rights of, a state.10 8 This reading of Mellon is an important re-
finement of that case's holding: a state may sue as parens patriae
alleging the unconstitutionality of a statute if it is harmed by the
statute, a harm not present in Mellon.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,10 9 which involved a challenge
to the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,110 the
Court rejected the state's claim to standing as parens patriae to
challenge the Act under the fifth amendment's due process
clause and article I's bill of attainder clause."' The Court
nevertheless permitted the state to challenge the constitutionality
of the Act as a violation of the fifteenth amendment. One
103 Ch. 410, 53 Stat. 114 (1939), as amended, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1946) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 1502(3) (1970)).
114 See Federal Highway Act, ch. 119, 42 Stat. 212 (1921), (repealed and replaced by
23 U.S.C. §§ 101-31 (1970)).
105 330 U.S. at 135.
1
6 Id. at 136.
107 Id.
"8$Id, at 139.
109 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
110 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-73p (1970).
1 383 U.S. at 323-24.
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commentator called this distinction between the state's different
parens patriae claims "mystifying.""' 2 Two respected commen-
tators 113 and at least one circuit court' 14 believe that the South
Carolina case casts serious doubt upon the continued vitality of
Mellon.
Even assuming Mellon's continued validity as a bar to state
parens patriae suits which allege the unconstitutionality of a sta-
tute, many courts have begun to distinguish such suits from state
parens patriae suits that seek review of federal agency action al-
legedly inconsistent with a federal statute. 115 Georgia"6 rejects
the notion that only the federal government stands in a parens
patriae relationship with citizens in respect to violations of federal
law. In Georgia, the state was permitted to sue as parens patriae
against a private party for violations of the federal antitrust laws.
The Court noted that such a state parens patriae suit "involved no
question of distribution of powers between the State and the
national government" as in Mellon." 7 Nor was Georgia seeking
"to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes""
8
as in Mellon. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission v. FCC" 9 noted
these two distinctions between Mellon and a state parens patriae
suit against a federal agency alleging that the agency has violated
its statutory mandate. There, the court permitted a state agency's
parens patriae suit challenging the validity of an FCC order.1
2 0
The state agency (WUTC) claimed that the FCC's order, which
authorized the entry of new carriers to provide specialized inter-
state communication services, violated applicable procedural re-
quirements and failed to consider the environmental impact of
its order as required by law.' 2' The court found that the tradi-
tional requirements of a state parens patriae suit were met: a
substantial number of Washington's citizens would be affected by
the increase in intra-state telephone rates that the order would
112 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 561 (3d ed. 1976).
113 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 112, and Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, in THE
SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1966) 86-88 (P. Kurland ed. 1966).
114 Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1153-54 n.16 (9th
Cir. 1975).
11 See text accompanying notes 119-29 infra.
116 324 U.S. 439 (1945). See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
117 324 U.S. at 445.
"1 Id. at 446-47.
119 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975).
12I A state statute authorized the state agency to sue federal agencies on behalf of
the state. Id. at 1148 n.6, 1152 n.13.12 1Id. at 1145.
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cause x22 and the state had "an interest independent of its indi-
vidual citizens, for increased rates for intrastate telephone ser-
vice would inhibit communication vital to the economic and so-
cial well-being of the community as a whole."'123 The court found
Mellon a bar only to state parens patriae suits alleging the uncon-
stitutionality of a federal statute.
WUTC does not attack the constitutionality of the
Communications Act on any ground; rather, it relies
upon the federal statute, and seeks to vindicate the con-
gressional will by preventing what it asserts to be a viola-
tion of that statute by the administrative agency charged
with its enforcement. That federal agency is not the
only public body that may invoke judicial assistance to
enforce the Act.'
2 4
The court felt that "none of the considerations that have
justified restrictions upon the power of the state to represent the
interest of its citizenry parens patriae are present here.' 2 5 For
example, the state was not seeking to invoke the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court and thereby burden its docket, and
because no other state was being sued, the suit was not attempting
to circumvent the eleventh amendment. 2 6 Because no absent
persons would be barred from a remedy otherwise available, the
proceeding could not be regarded as merely a substitute for a
class action without its procedural safeguards. 2 7 Where no
122 WUTC contends that by authorizing new carriers to furnish specialized
interstate communication services without determining that present carriers are
unable to meet the need for this service, and without individualized determina-
tion of economic exclusivity, the Commission's order will result in an increase
in the number of carriers competing to provide this interstate service and will
decrease the usage existing carriers will make of common telephone facilities
for the purpose of providing interstate service. This in turn will require alloca-
tion to intrastate service of a larger share of the costs of service and equipment
used in providing both intrastate and interstate services, and will compel
WUTC to raise rates for intrastate service, contrary to the interests of
Washington telephone users.
Id. at 1147.123 Id. at 1152.
124 The court cited the Georgia case for its proposition that the FCC "is not the only
public body that may invoke judicial assistance to enforce the Act." Id. at 1153.
'2 5 1d. at 1152.
126 See Comment, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN.
L. REv. 665, 674 (1958), for the view that the policy underlying the 11th amendment
appears to be the principle limitation on the state's attempt to assert the interests of its
citizens as parens patriae. Citizens should not be allowed to assign their claims to their
state merely to circumvent the sovereign immunity of another state. The Court adheres
to this principle as set forth in New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
'127 See text accompanying notes 193-205 infra.
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monetary damages were sought, there was no risk of duplicative
recovery if a subsequent action were initiated. WUTC, unlike
Lord, drew a distinction between statutory review and constitu-
tional challenges to federal statutes, the latter being dangerously
"political" for parens patriae purposes. Instead, the state of
Washington was relying upon a federal statute and attempting to
"vindicate Congressional will by preventing what it asserts to be a
violation of that statute by the administrative agency charged
with its enforcement."'12 8 The courts analogized to Georgia v.
Pennsylvania Railroad12 9 for the idea that federal agencies are not
the only public bodies which may invoke judicial assistance to
enforce federal law.
Another recognition that threats to the general economic
well-being of a state justify parens patriae suits against the federal
government, notwithstanding Mellon, appeared in Guam v. Fed-
eral Maritime Commission.'3" The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia permitted the territory of Guam to sue as parens
patriae for review of the FMC's order approving rate increases
for water carriers that were essential to Guam's transportation
and economy. The court narrowed its earlier holding in Lord.'3'
Although the court did not fully explain this distinction, it seemed
to distinguish state challenges to federal orders broadly affecting
the regulation of interstate commerce and challenges to orders
directed at that state only. In Guam, as in New York v. United
States, the political unit bringing suit was the locality subject to
the challenged rate orders and was therefore entitled to seek
remedial action as parens patriae.
The decline in the importance of the Mellon doctrine as an
obstacle to state standing to challenge federal agency action is
exemplified by Florida v. Weinberger.132 Florida participates in the
Medicaid program 133 through which it receives federal funds
after obtaining approval for its medical assistance plan from the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). The state's
plan must provide for a state board to license nursing home
128 513 F.2d at 1153.
.29 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945): "the fact that the United States may bring criminal
prosecutions or suits for injunctions .. .does not mean that [a state] may not maintain
[a parens patriae suit]."
130 329 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
131 274 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
132 492 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1974).
133 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970).
1092
RE-EXAMINATION OF PARENS PATRIAE
administrators if nursing homes are part of the state's plan. 134 In
1970, the Secretary promulgated regulations that permitted
the state board to consist of a majority of nursing home
administrators.135 Shortly thereafter, Florida enacted a statute
providing for such a majority. Two years later, the Secretary
revised the regulations to require each state board to consist
of less than a majority "of a single profession or institutional
category.' 1 36 Florida sued the Secretary, claiming that the
amended regulation exceeded the Secretary's authority. 137 The
court found that Florida had standing "arising from its clear
interest both in the manner in which the Medicaid program is
administered vis .vis its citizens and in being spared the recon-
stitution of its statutory program .... -138 The court did not
consider the Mellon case in its discussion. The court synthesized
the notion of parens patriae with the format of an administrative
law proceeding to produce a manageable adjudicatory frame-
work. Mellon's fears of the courts becoming mired in political
struggles was not a concern here; rather, the court was asked to
exercise judicial review over the quasi-judicial administrative
agencies. The courts as ultimate arbitrators of federal law may
thereby adjudicate the rights of parties emmeshed in the ad-
ministrative process.
Mellon is simply no longer compelling. Federal administra-
tive action is no longer immune to judicial review, as an exami-
nation of the administrative law procedures indicates. An
examination of the principles used to determine standing to
challenge federal agency action under the APA provides a more
appropriate basis for establishing when a state may properly
challenge federal agency action. The traditional parens patriae
doctrine alone is inadequate because of the confusion it has
engendered.139 A synthesis of principles of standing under
the APA and certain notions derived from the parens patriae doc-
trine results in an appropriate test for determining when a state
should have standing to challenge federal agency action. The
Comment now examines the principles of standing under the
APA.
134 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1970). See 492 F.2d at 490.
135 See 492 F.2d at 491.
136 Id.
137 Id.
13 8 Id. at 494.
139 See text accompanying notes 13-56 supra.
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IV. STANDING TO SEEK REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY
DECISIONS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
Is THERE A ROLE FOR THE STATE?
A. Judicial Review: Providing a Watchdog
Over Federal Agencies
Judicial review of federal administrative action is a major
component of federal court dockets. 140 Congress has provided
that individuals aggrieved by allegedly illegal agency action are
entitled to judicial review of that action in order to protect the
individual's interest in the proper enforcement of congressional
will by federal agencies. The hope is that by subjecting agencies
to such review, Congress has provided a check on the tendency
towards inertia and self-perpetuation found in any bureaucratic
structure. 141
An examination of the new developments in the standing
requirement indicates a congressional desire to increase the
availability of review. This desire is shared by the courts. The
present standing requirements are derived from the "right of
review" section of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA):'
42
"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof. ' 143 While these standing requirements have undergone
considerable change in the last half century, 144 they are presently
set forth in two 1970 Supreme Court cases.
140 For example, as early as 1957, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote of the Supreme
Court's case load: "[R]eview of administrative action, mainly reflecting enforcement of
federal regulatory statutes, constitutes the largest category of the Court's work, compris-
ing one-third of the total cases decided on the merits." Frankfurter, The Supreme Court
in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 793 (1957). See also 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958).
141 See Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents, and Administrative Justice, 37 J. LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 42 (1972).
142 Friendly, Foreword to B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF
GOVERNMENT at xv (1972).
143 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
144 The "legal right" standard of standing to challenge federal agency action was
developed during the early period of the growth of federal agencies that began with
the New Deal and became embodied in the APA. E.g., Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570,
574 (8th Cir. 1962); Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912, 914 (2d
Cir. 1960); Kansas City Power & Light Company v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C.
Cir. 1955). The "legal right" standard limited access to the court to those to whom the
federal agency in question owed a legal duty set forth in a relevant statute. See, e.g.,
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v.
TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). The "legal right" standard was ultimately rejected as
going to the merits of a case rather than to the issue of standing. Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). See text accompanying notes
146-51 & note 151 infra.
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In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp,145 the Court established a three-part test for standing to
sue a federal agency: (1) the plaintiff must "alleg[e] that the
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise;' 146 (2) "the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question;' 147  (3) judicial review must not be precluded by
Congress.' 48 In Barlow v. Collins,'14 9 decided the same day as Data
Processing, the Court required that the plaintiffs themselves fall
within the "zone of interest."' 50 Thus, either the plaintiffs them-
selves or an interest asserted by them must be arguably within
the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee.'
5'
B. The "Zone of Interest" Test: Are the States
Arguably within the Zone of Interests
Protected by Federal Statutes?
The zone of interest test makes certain that a party is fur-
thering interests that Congress sought to protect. 52 The in-
145 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
146 1d. at 152.
' 47 1d. at 153.
1
48 Id. at 157.
149 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
30 Id. at 164.
131 The administrative procedure standing test, of course, must meet the minimum
standing requirements imposed by the "case or controversy" clause of article III of the
Constitution. In Barlow, the Court notes that the injury in fact requirement establishes
the personal stake and interest that impart the concrete adverseness required by article
III. 397 U.S. at 164.
152 The origin of the zone of interest test is unclear. Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d
1233, 1243 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973) declared that "[w]hateverjustifica-
tion there may be for imposing, in addition to the case or controversy requirements of
Article III, a zone of interest requirement for standing to seek judicial review of agency
action, must be found in some notion of separation of powers." But see Davis v. Rom-
ney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1363 (3d Cir. 1974): "[the zone of interest test] does not de-
rive from the limitation of article III courts to decision of cases or controversies; it is
not designed to ensure a contest between adverse interests. Instead, [this] requirement
derives from Congressional power to regulate, within limits, jurisdiction of the federal
courts." Despite liberal judicial interpretation of the test, it has been criticized as an
excuse for failure to grant relief despite the existence of injury to a plaintiff. See Sym-
posium on Federal Agencies and the Public Interest: New Directions in Administrative Practice,
26 AxMtm. L. REv. 423, 448 n.16 (1974). The test is said to restrict potential public
interest litigants, contrary to the philosophy that confers standing to private litigants
solely on the basis of representation of the public interest. See Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942); accord, FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S.
239, 247 (1943).
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terest asserted by a plaintiff may stem from noneconomic values,
such as aesthetic, conservational and recreational values, as well
as from economic injury.1 53 For example, an unsuccessful bidder
for a government contract suffers an economic loss falling within
the zone of interests protected by applicable procurement
statutes.154 Plaintiffs asserting an environmental interest fall
within the zone of interests protected by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).1 55 A plaintiff need not be a
primary intended beneficiary of the federal statute in question to
fall within the zone of protected interests.
156
Data Processing noted that "the trend is toward enlargement
of the class of people who may protest administrative action. The
whole drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved 'persons' is
symptomatic of that trend. 15 7 This trend toward enlargement of
the class who may challenge federal agency action, and the
framework of the federal system today which integrates states'
participation in so many federal programs, 58 warrant that states
be deemed within the zone of interest of federal statutes that
they assist in administering. Each state should be deemed a
beneficiary of those federal programs in which it plays a part in
effectuating congressional purposes. When a state participates
with the federal government in programs that enhance the
well-being of the state's citizens, the state qua state has an interest
in their proper administration. The state responsibility in help-
ing to administer such programs creates a state interest in the
proper execution of the congressional will.' 59 A state today has
as great an interest in the proper administration of these prog-
rams as it has in the protection of its environment from pollut-
ers, the prevention of the diversion of its waters, and the enjoin-
ing of antitrust violations that threaten the state's economic
well-being-the traditional interests for which a state may assert
parens patriae status.
153 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
154 Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911
(1973).
155 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 683-90 (1973).
156See Peoples v. Department of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(poor people are within the zone of interests protected by the Food Stamp Act regard-
less of whether they are primary or secondary beneficiaries of the Act).
157 397 U.S. at 154.
158 See text accompanying notes 91-99 supra.
159 Of course, a state need not participate in the program to fall within the statute's
zone of interest if the statute's legislative history or the statute on its face evidences an
intention to protect the interests of the state. See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F.
Supp. 889, 893-95 (D. Conn. 1976).
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The Ninth Circuit, in City of Davis v. Coleman,1 60 adopts just
such an interpretation of the zone of interest test when a state or
local government sues a federal agency. In City of Davis, a
California city sought to enjoin the Secretary of Transportation
and others from constructing a freeway interchange. The city
alleged that the Division of Highways of the California Depart-
ment of Public Works (CDHW) and the Federal Highway Ad-
ministration (FHWA) failed to hold public hearings required by
the Federal Aid Highway Act 16 1 and that the CDHW and FHWA
failed to prepare and file an environmental impact statement as
required by NEPA and an environmental impact report required
by a California environmental statute. 62 The court found that
the city had standing under both NEPA and the state environ-
mental law.' 63 As to the city's standing under NEPA, the court
had no trouble finding the city arguably within the zone of pro-
tected interests under NEPA:
In a sense ... the intended beneficiaries of NEPA are
individual citizens; but the statute expressly contemplates that
state and local governments are to play an important role in
the effectuation of national environmental policy. Thus, while
a municipality's interest in agency compliance with
NEPA in one sense derives from the interests of its
citizens in avoiding the consequences of environmental
damage, under California law it is the municipality
which is entrusted with protection of certain of these
environmental interests, by virtue of statutory duties to
develop and enforce a general plan, to maintain or con-
tract for a municipal water supply, and so on. Accord-
ingly we hold that Davis' municipal interests fall within
the scope of NEPA's protections.
The fact that [NEPA] expressly contemplates local
government participation in the [environmental impact
statement] review process also indicates that Davis is
"arguably" within the zone of NEPA's procedural
safeguards.
64
160 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
161 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
162 See 521 F.2d at 665-66; § 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970); Chapter Three of the California Environ-
mental Quality Act of 1970 (CEQA), CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West Supp. 1977).
163 521 F.2d at 670-73.
164 Id. at 672 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
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Thus, the court found that participation in the administration of
federal statutes arguably brings governmental units within the
zone of interests protected by the statute. 165 This is an appro-
priate interpretation of the zone of interest test in determining
state standing to sue federal agencies in light of federal-state
relations today and the trend toward expanding the scope of
standing.
C. The Injury In Fact Requirement
In addition to falling within the zone of interest arguably
protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question,
a plaintiff must suffer some injury in fact caused by the
defendant's action. This injury in fact may be "economic or
otherwise."'166 Whatever the injury, the party seeking review of
agency action under the APA must actually be among the in-
jured. For example, in Sierra Club v. Morton,' 67 the Supreme
Court denied standing to an environmental group that sought to
challenge the legality of a large-scale recreational development
project in a national forest because the organization failed to
allege any specific injury to its members. The respondents in
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 68 however, carefully tailored their claims to meet the
Sierra Club standards. SCRAP alleged that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission's refusal to suspend a surcharge on railroad
freight rates would discourage the use of recyclable materials
and promote the unnecessary use of new raw materials, thereby
directly causing its members economic, recreational, and aes-
thetic harm.16 9 SCRAP specifically alleged that as a result of the
agency's action (1) each of its members has had to pay more for
finished products, (2) that each of its members uses the natural
resources in the Washington area such as streams, forests, and
mountains for recreational activities and that such uses had been
adversely affected by the increased freight rates, (3) that each of
its members breathes the air in the Washington area and that the
16" Some statutes expressly bring governmental units within the zone of interests
they were intended to protect. City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn.
1976) (City of Hartford, Connecticut, is within the zone of interests to be protected by
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-17 (Supp. V
1975)).
166 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 686 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
167 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
168 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
169 Id. at 678.
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air has suffered increased pollution as a result of the new freight
rate structure, and (4) "each member has been forced to pay
increased taxes because of the sums which must be expended to
dispose of otherwise reusable waste materials."'17 0 Such allega-
tions, although generalized, were sufficient to give the organiza-
tion standing to assert the grievances of its members.
A state should be deemed to suffer injury in fact as a result
of federal agency action when it suffers the same sort of
generalized type of harm. Such an injury in fact to the state,
which is analogous to the independent state interest required in
traditional parens patriae actions,' 17 coupled with a requirement
that a substantial number of its citizens be injured, a require-
ment also derived from traditional parens patriae doctrine, in-
sures that a state will not be litigating the claims of special in-
terests. Moreover, the requirement of a generalized harm to the
state's economy, environment, or to the health, safety or welfare
of its citizens, eliminates the unnecessary and confusing distinc-
tion between proprietary and quasi-sovereign parens patriae
claims.'
7 2
That the public at large is affected and that individuals have
no real incentive to vindicate their claims are strikingly compar-
able to the requirements for parens patriae analyzed above. Just as
public interest litigation allows one party to present those claims
that affect concerned citizens as a whole, so parens patriae al-
lows the state to investigate and litigate the broader ramifications
of agency actions so that courts may properly assess the merits of
the issue. If injury to an organization's members, properly al-
leged, gives the organization standing to redress their grievances
and additionally assert the public interest, then the state argu-
ably occupies the same position under the logic of administrative
law principles. 7 3 From a practical standpoint as well, both public
interest organizations and states are able to aggregate the small
but numerous claims of individuals and provide an effective ad-
vocacy of the public interest. The state's role as plaintiff not only
lends its powerful legal arsenal and investigative resources to the
pursuit of an adequate remedy but also renders an intangible
"respectability" to the lawsuit. It also emphasizes that our gov-
1 7 0 Id.
1' See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
172 See text accompanying notes 43-56 supra.
173 Whether the state has standing should turn not only on its suffering of injury in
fact but also upon its falling within the zone of interest arguably protected the statute
establishing the program. See text accompanying notes 153-65 supra.
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ernment is a system of checks and balances, including that be-
tween the states and the federal government, and'that the states
retain the power to insure the proper administration of federal
law. If the purpose of the law of standing is to insure the "con-
crete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions,"'1 74 then the state is a proper
litigant where, as in parens patriae cases, a substantial number or
an important interest of its populace has been adversely affected.
Increases in railroad rates, the enforcement of federal safety and
health standards, transportation.:control plans, food and drug
regulation, and utilities regulation, to name but a few examples,
all affect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens and are,
moreover, areas which occupy a great deal of attention within
state government. Injury to such quasi-sovereign interests that
additionally include an interest in the responsible and fair ad-
ministration of federal laws should be sufficient to meet the Data
Processing test.
D. The New Parens Patriae:
State Challenges of Federal Agency Action
The very purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act is to
check the power of federal administrative agencies by providing
a minimum standard of review in the absence of an express
statutory review provision. 1 75 To allow states parens patriae
standing is to insure that those actions which have the most
harmful or arbitrary affect will be challenged-and by a plaintiff
who is able to bear the burden of protracted and complex litiga-
tion. If broadened standing has indeed forced the administrative
process to recognize and heed those who were previously denied
the right to challenge illegal action, 76 then the states are cer-
tainly capable of ascertaining, shaping, and asserting those rights
as parens patriae.
The confusion engendered by the traditional parens patriae
doctrine and the availability of an established set of standards for
determining standing to challenge federal agency action under
the APA favors adopting the standing test of the APA to the
area of state parens patriae suits against federal agencies. As a
result, a state challenging an agency's administration of a federal
program should be considered to be within the zone of interest
'7 4 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
17 See Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); S. REP. No.
752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1945).
17' See Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1971).
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arguably protected by the statute establishing the program if the
state participates in the administration of that program. 177 The
state should be deemed to suffer injury in fact if a substantial
number of its citizens are harmed by the agency action and the
state thereby suffers a generalized harm.
A state could thereby mobilize its powerful legal resources,
including ample funding and staffing, on behalf of its citizens
when they are harmed by federal agency action, rather than let
the burden fall upon individual injured parties whose resources
may be inadequate for the task. Moreover, permitting state pa-
rens patriae suits within the framework of APA standing re-
quirements helps fulfill the purpose of the APA-to check the
power of federal administrative agencies by providing for ex-
panded judicial review of their actions unless a particular statute
expressly forbids such review.'
7 8
The proposed parens patriae standard would lead to the same
result in Kleppe as reached by the court, but the rationale is
somewhat different. The Small Business Act provides that the
Administrator of the SBA may "accept the services and facilities
of State, and local agencies and groups, both public and private,
and utilize such gratuitous services and facilities as may, from
time to time, be necessary, to further the objectives of" the
Act.17 The SBA is also permitted to grant up to $40,000 in any
one state to the state government or any state agency thereof for
the purposes of research and counseling "concerning the man-
agement, financing, and operation of small business enterprises"
for the purposes of carrying out other duties under the Act.'
8
)
Pennsylvania, however, does not provide services or facilities to
the Administrator nor does it undertake research for the SBA or
otherwise participate in the administration of the program.'81
Moreover, neither the Small Business Act on its face nor the
Act's legislative history express a concern for the states. 182 Thus,
in examining the state's basis for standing under APA standards,
the court correctly determined that Pennsylvania was not "argu-
ably within the zone of interests protected by the Small Business
Act."' 8
3
177 See note 159 supra.
178 See Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); H.R. REP. No.
1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946); S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31
(1945).
179 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(9) (1970).
18 0 1d. § 636(d).
181 533 F.2d at 672.
182 Id. at 671-72.
1
8
3 Id. at 671.
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The court's treatment of the state's injury in fact, however,
needlessly embodies the confusion caused by the proprietary-
quasi-sovereign distinction. The court stated that "[t]he alleged
injuries to the state's economy and the health, safety and welfare
of its people clearly implicate the parens patriae rather than the
proprietary interest of the state.' 1 8 4 The court, therefore, did
not consider these alleged harms under the injury in fact re-
quirement of the APA. In addition, the court found the remain-
ing allegations of harm to the state's proprietary interests185 too
attenuated in their relationship to the agency action to constitute
injury in fact.
186
When it considered the alleged harm to the state's economy
and the health, safety and welfare of its citizens under the state
parens patriae claim, the court acknowledged that states "have an
underlying interest in the continuing prosperity of their
economies.187 Moreover, the court conceded that "injury to the
state's economy or the health and welfare of its citizens, if suffi-
ciently severe and generalized, can give rise to a quasi-sovereign
interest in relief as will justify a representative action by the
state.' 1 88 The court, however, did not decide whether the alleged
injuries to these interests were sufficiently severe and gener-
alized because it found that the Mellon doctrine barred the asser-
tion of such an interest against a federal agency.' 89
The continued viability of Mellon has already been ques-
tioned.1913 Moreover, under the proposed standard for state
parens patriae standing against federal agencies, no distinction is
drawn between so-called proprietary and quasi-sovereign in-
terests. The interests themselves are crucial; the labels attached
to the interests are unimportant and only cause confusion. A
state suffers injury in fact sufficient to give it parens patriae stand-
ing when it suffers a generalized harm to its economy, environ-
ment, or the health, safety or welfare of its citizens. As the dis-
sentingjudge in Kleppe noted, Pennsylvania alleged a generalized
economic harm resulting from the SBA's response to the devas-
tation wrought by Hurricane Agnes.' 91
184 Id.
' These allegations were that the state's reputation would be damaged by the im-
pairment of its ability to provide relief to its injured citizens and that state tax revenues
would decline as a result of the agency's action. Id. at 672.




188 Id. at 675.
189 Id. at 675-79.
"I See text accompanying notes 91-138 supra.
191 533 F.2d at 682-83 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
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Thus, under the proposed test, Pennsylvania has suffered
injury in fact as a result of agency action, but does not fall within
the zone of interests arguably protected by the Small Business
Act. Nevertheless numerous instances will arise in which the
state satisfies the Data Processing requirements in asserting a
parens patriae claim. But are parens patriae suits really needed if
private litigants are able to assert their own claims? More ex-
plicitly, has the emergence of the class action obviated the need
for state suits on behalf of the public? Unless the class action is
shown to be an ineffective remedy in certain types of mass litiga-
tion, either because the class action format has been disallowed,
or, even where it has been allowed, relief was inadequate, the
parens patriae suit may no longer be necessary.
V. CLASS ACTIONS AND THE PARENS PATRIAE
DOCTRINE
A state parens patriae suit on behalf of its citizens against a
federal agency may be unnecessary if private persons-or the
state itself-may assert claims in a class action in federal court.
192
A brief examination of the differences between class actions and
parens patriae suits, however, indicates that states have a vital role
to play as parens patriae, notwithstanding the availability of the
class action.
Courts have been firm in their refusal to allow a state parens
patriae standing in situations where class actions could have been
brought.1 9 3 For example, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil of Califor-
nia,194 the Court would not permit the state to seek a mone-
tary recovery on behalf of citizens injured by an antitrust viola-
tion. The court dismissed the state's argument that individuals
would not be able-in a practical sense-to obtain an adequate
remedy.
192 There are several prerequisites for a plaintiff to maintain a class action, includ-
ing the requirements (1) that the class "is so numerous that the joinder of all members
is impracticable," (2) that "there are questions of law or fact common to the class," (3)
that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class," (4) that "the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class," and that (5) "the court finds the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affect-
ing only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
See generally Comment, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae
Suits for Damages, 6 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 411, 422 (1970).
193 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil of Calif., 405 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1972); Califor-
nia v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 776-77 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
194 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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Notwithstanding the theoretical relationship between parens
patriae and class actions, the Court asserted its strong preference
for the latter. By providing specific rules for delineating the
appropriate plaintiff class, establishing who is bound by the ac-
tion, and thereby preventing duplicate recovery, rule 23 sup-
posedly assured that the claim of the representative is typical of
all the claims and that common law issues of law or fact will
predominate over those which only affected individual members.
A consideration of the doctrinal and practical differences be-
tween parens patriae suits and class actions, however, indicates the
preferability of the parens patriae doctrine in the federal agency
context.
A parens patriae suit against a federal agency under the
proposed standards arises when the state itself suffers a
generalized harm to its economy, environment or the health,
safety or welfare of its citizens. 195 The state thus suffers an in-
jury separate and distinct from the injury suffered by individual
members of any class of citizens affected by the same agency
action. The state's injury is greater than the sum of the indi-
vidual citizens' claims. While a class action under rule 23(b)(3) is
an aggregation of individual claims linked by their similarity, 196 a
state parens patriae suit encompasses a separate injury to the pub-
lic as represented by the state. One commentator has noted this
doctrinal distinction between state parens patriae suits and class
actions:
Damages awarded through a class action are for in-
terests different from the interests recompensed by a
parens patriae suit. A damage award to a class is the sum
of the proven damages of each of the plaintiff class
members. The class action is only a procedural method
of enforcing each individual's substantive rights. The
parens patriae action is not simply a procedural remedy;
nor does it seek recovery for the multiple interests of
diverse plaintiffs. In the parens patriae suit the state sues
to protect its own quasi-sovereign interests. These
quasi-sovereign interests are substantive rights of the
individual state, which, when violated, give rise to a
cause of action by the state.' 97
195 See text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.
196 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
197 Comment, note 192 supra, at 428. Under the proposed test, of course, the
"quasi-sovereign" label is no longer important. The state need only allege a generalized
harm to its economy, environment, or the health, safety or welfare of its people, rather
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Therefore, a proper parens patriae suit is not superseded by the
class action because the state is asserting an interest separate
from and atypical of the interests of the class.
198
Moreover, a parens patriae suit has practical advantages over
a class action that also preserve the vitality of parens patriae suits.
The difficulties with mass litigation have become more appar-
ent since the adoption of rule 23. The effect of Snyder v. Harris'99
and Zahn v. International Paper Co. 200 was to limit the use of class
actions in the federal system by requiring that, in cases of diver-
sity jurisdiction, 1) the representative of the class must himself
meet the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement, and that 2) each
individual member must meet the statutory requirement of
$10,000 (the so-called "nonaggregation rule"). Eisen v. Carlisle &
than attempt to discern whether its injured interests fall within the traditional "quasi-
sovereign" category.
198 A state may sue as class representative in a class action when it suffers the same
harm as those it represents and does not suffer an injury distinct from that of members
of the class. See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn.
1968) (states may sue as class representatives for classes consisting of governmental
units and agencies within the state in a treble-damage antitrust action alleging price-
fixing in the sale of steel); Illinois v. Brunswick Corp., 32 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. Ill. 1963)
(state may sue as class representative on behalf of all state school districts in a treble
damage antitrust action alleging the illegal elimination of competition in the sale of
folding gymnasium bleachers). See also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1971) (requirements of rule 23(a) met in antitrust action against drug
manufacturers brought by state to recover through their attorneys general damages on
behalf of consumers who had not themselves filed any claims); Ohio v. Richter Con-
crete Corp., 669 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Ohio 1975). But see City of Chicago v. General Motors
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir.
1972). The city was declared an inadequate representative to bring a class action alleg-
ing that the tortious conduct of the defendants in manufacturing cars which emitted
contaminants thereby injured the municipality; the city could not purport to represent
all citizens of Chicago where many, such as vehicle dealers and service station owners,
would be adversely affected by such a ruling.
The issue in Chicago presents a problem whose resolution is beyond the scope of
this Comment but which must nevertheless be set out. A state parens patriae suit pro-
ceeds on the assumption that there is a homogeneity of interests which the state may
thereby assert. The state sues on behalf of its citizens and in their generalized interest.
But what if wide differences of opinion and interest exist among the citizenry? For
example, a federal pollution control order directed at a large company threatens the
continued economic viability of a small town if the termination of operations is more
efficient than compliance. Although environmentalists would favor the federal action,
those citizens whose economic livelihoods depend on that company might feel differ-
ently. To which group does the state stand as parens patriae? In this example, economic
values are directly in conflict with environmental and aesthetic concerns. It seems
reasonable that states be allowed to decide what is in "the public interest" for purposes
of a parens patriae suit and that the court give deference to the state's assertion that it is
representing its citizens. Otherwise, federal courts would become embroiled in an
issue-the validity of state authority under its police power-for which no judicially
manageable standards exist.
199 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
200 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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Jacqelin' t imposed the burdensome requirement of "indi-
vidual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. ' 20 2 Moreover, the inability of public interest
organizations to recover attorney's fees20 3 would frustrate the
pursuit of remedies even where a class can be defined but the
initial costs of raising a claim are prohibitive. Widespread relief
to large classes of persons for whom individual suits are not a
realistic alternative is thereby made increasingly difficult to ob-
tain. As the class grows in size, and identification of individual
members becomes more difficult, the class action gradually as-
sumes characteristics of a public interest action. A representative
becomes more interested in asserting the rights of the group per
se inasmuch as the larger the class, the more difficult it becomes
to distinguish between the interests of the class and the interests
of the general public or a segment of it. The state is capable of
asserting those interests. Although a state cannot apply the pa-
rens patriae doctrine to instances in which it alleged no injury
independent of that of its citizens, it can be a more manageable
solution where the class action is unworkable, or simply unneces-
sary.
The denial of class action status where it would serve no
useful purpose occurred in Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co. 20 4 A
civil rights action by customers of a utility company sought a
declaration that the termination of services without adequate
prior notice and without a fair and impartial hearing was uncon-
stitutional. The court held that such a claim could not properly
be maintained as a class action on behalf of all persons residing
in the city who had applied for utility services, and further as-
serted that where there was no request for damages, either indi-
vidually or collectively, there was no point in permitting the case
to proceed as a class action.
20-1 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).
202 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950) for the "reasonable effort" notice requirements. The notice provision is
increasingly viewed as less essential to the maintenance of a class action, however. In
Management T.V. Sys. Inc. v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D. 162, 165 (E.D. Pa.
1971), for example, the court declared that "where a class is adequately represented,
and where there is no conflict of interest between members of a class, a judgment
binding on all members does not offend due process." But until the notice provision
somehow becomes more workable, parens patriae suits provide a superior form of relief
where a substantial interest of the state is involved.
20 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240 (1975), holding
that, with a few narrow exceptions, the federal courts have no power to award attor-
neys' fees in the absence of specific statutory authority.
204 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972).
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One court in fact specifically precluded the use of a class
action where full injunctive and/or declaratory relief awarded on
behalf of the named plaintiffs, including the city of Hartford,
Connecticut, would benefit the entire class. 20 5 The assumption in
City of Hartford v. Hills seems just the opposite of that in Hawaii v.
Standard Oil of California,20 6 and California v. Frito-Lay, Inc.;
20 7 if
the governmental entity is capable of seeking relief that would
accrue to the entire class, then the class action suit will be pre-
cluded. Without having to delineate the class per se and confine
the scope of claims to those typical of the class, the state as parens
patriae is a fortiori able to represent any citizen aggrieved by the
action; the claims presented may encompass a wide range of
issues showing the disparate but connected ways in which the
state has been injured by the action in question.
Congress has expressed its preference for parens patriae suits
rather than class action suits in the antitrust context. The Anti-
trust Improvements Act of 19762o8 is premised upon the
practical advantages of the parens patriae suit. The Act was
enacted by Congress in response to Frito-Lay in which California
was denied the right to represent its citizens as parens patriae in
recovering monetary damages in an antitrust action. "The thrust
of the Act is to overturn Frito-Lay by allowing State attorneys
general to act as consumer advocates in the enforcement process,
while at the same time avoiding the problems of manageability
which some courts have found under Rule 23. ' '2o9
The Act authorizes a state's attorney general to file suits in
the name of the state on behalf of natural persons in the state to
recover treble damages and costs for all antitrust violations, ex-
cept those violations of the Clayton Act resulting from price
discrimination and anticompetitive mergers.2 10 Although the
Act authorizes courts in their discretion, or upon the motion of
any party, to order that the state proceed as representative of
any class or classes of persons alleged to have been injured, the
parens patriae suit is generally favored and will be abandoned
only "where the interests of justice would be served thereby. '
21
1
In such a situation, the state attorney general could then serve as
2015 City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
206 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
217 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
208 Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
2(19 H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report].
2
111 d. at 10.
211 Id. at 10. The Report suggests that such a situation would arise "when both
businesses and natural persons have been injured in exactly the same manner." Id.
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:1069
class representative. Because the intent of Congress is that such a
conversion from parens patriae to class representative will be rare,
the provision exists to give courts the maximum flexibility in
structuring individual and consolidated actions to achieve a just
result. "Only where some positive impediment to the mainte-
nance of a parens patriae action exists should a court have to
resort to the [class action]. '21
2
The legislative history of the Act indicates that "[o]ne of the
subsidiary purposes of [the Act] is to avoid, in consumer actions,
the cumbersome litigation of peripheral issues which under Rule
23 has sometimes become more time-consuming and costly than
litigating the merits of the case. ' 213 Congress correctly perceived
that the problems in the class action form214 make it less than
totally effective, and recognized the flexibility and practicality of
a parens patriae suit.21 5 In short, the Act is a congressional decla-
ration that a parens patriae suit is not only an appropriate vehicle
for the enforcement of federal legislation but also is superior to
the class action in many practical respects.
216
2 12 Id. at 11.
213 Id.
214 Congress noted the manageability problems of a class action, including proper
notice and the requirements of the Eisen case, "the complexity of evidentiary issues, and
distribution of any recoveries." Id. at 6, 7. Congress also noted the unavailability of
attorney's fees as a result of the Alyeska case, id. at 19, and rectified that problem by
permitting the state to recover costs in an antitrust parens patriae suit.
215 Congress did impose some safeguards on the use of the parens patriae suit bor-
rowed from the class action. The Act requires a less stringent form of notice than rule
23: the state must provide notice of its parens patriae action by publication. "If the court
finds that notice given solely by publication would deny due process of law to any
person or persons, the court may direct further notice to such person or persons ac-
cording to the circumstances of the case." Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976). Congress clearly intended to dispense with the type of individual notice re-
quired by the Supreme Court in the Eisen case, note 201 supra: "[Tlhe committee be-
lieves that the imaginative use of publication notice will suffice in the vast bulk of pa-
rens patriae anti-trust suits.... Only in extraordinary circumstances where publication
notice would be manifestly unfair should courts require more." Report, supra note 209,
at 12. A person so notified may exclude his claim from the state suit. Pub. L. No.
94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). Furthermore, a state parens patriae antitrust suit
may not be compromised or dismissed without court approval Jd.
216 Criticism of the Act appeared recently in Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the
Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J.
626 (1976). The authors argue that the Antitrust Parens Patriae Act fails to provide
such basic safeguards as ensuring (1) that there is a commonality of interests among the
class, (2) that the subclass of those with divergent views will be adequately and sepa-
rately represented, (3) that the plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of those on whose behalf he sues, and (4) that the claims presented are typical. The
authors criticize both the effectiveness and the constitutionality of the new Act; they
assert that its alleged failure to meet the above requirements violates the constitutional
principles concerning representation of absent parties. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32 (1940).
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What Congress has chosen to spell out as parens patriae
requirements in the antitrust context could easily be applied by
the courts in other contexts. In Kleppe, for example, the court,
had it found standing,217 might have allowed the maintenance of
the parens patriae action provided that some sort of notice was
provided to small businesses harmed by the cutoff of aid. Such
notice would allow the small businesses to intervene, to help the
state gather data and other records with regard to the merits of
the parens patriae claim, or to disassociate themselves from the
action.
In summary, parens patriae may, under certain circum-
stances, mitigate the "manageability crisis"'218 in class actions.
While achieving rule 23 goals of fairness and judicial economy,
parens patriae suits remain distinct from class actions in that they
allow the state to assert an interest of its own that is distinct from
the legally redressable rights of certain individuals. The parens
patriae suit is able to overcome the problems that have arisen in
class actions and to encourage the competent handling of public
interest claims. The benefit of the judgment automatically ac-
crues to the general public through injunctive, declaratory, or
other types of relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
Parens patriae suits remain a viable and desirable alternative
for a state's assertion of grievances concerning its general well-
being. Parens patriae suits are needed in certain circumstances
where neither an individual litigant nor a class action would be
able-in a practical sense-to obtain adequate relief from illegal
government action. Although individuals who are adversely
affected by agency action have standing to seek review, the ob-
stacles to litigation, such as time, cost, and lack of sufficient in-
centive may prevent the adjudication of the merits of a claim
involving significant and substantial interests. The Mellon
doctrine should no longer be an obstacle to state parens patriae
suits against the federal government. The development of
federal-state relations, the role of federal programs in Ameri-
cans' lives, and state participation in those programs make a
prohibition against state parens patriae suits untenable. 219
217 Under the proposed test, standing would still be doubtful given the state's fail-
ure to satisfy the "zone of interest" test. See text accompanying notes 152-65 supra.
21
8 See Note, The Manageability Crisis of Consumer Class Actions: The Severe Example of
Eisen III, 7 IND. L. REv. 360 (1973).
219 State suits against federal agencies recognize the state interest in federal pro-
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In deciding whether to entertain a parens patriae claim
against a federal administrative agency, courts should rely upon
the standards developed under the APA. A state should be
deemed within the zone of interests not only when the statute or
its legislative history expressly contemplates such inclusion, but
also when the state participates in the effectuation of the federal
program. The state should be deemed to suffer injury in fact
when it suffers a generalized harm to its economy, environment,
or the health, safety or welfare of its citizens. Parens patriae thus
provides the nexus between the injury incurred by citizens and
the state itself so that the state may litigate on their behalf and
thereby fulfill its sovereign responsibilities.220
The availability of class actions does not eliminate the de-
sirability of a state parens patriae suit against federal agencies. In
a proper parens patriae suit not only is the state asserting an
injury apart from injuries suffered by all others, but a parens
patriae suit also does not face many of the procedural obstacles
encumbering a class action.
A state parens patriae suit against a federal agency that is
either overstepping its statutory mandate or otherwise malad-
ministering a federal statute is an appropriate means of provid-
ing oversight of federal administrative action. Permitting such
state standing against federal agencies would be part of a trend
toward enlarging the class of plaintiffs able to challenge wrong-
ful federal agency action and would further the congressional
desire to ensure the proper administration of federal statutes.
Parens patriae suits may confer upon the states a broad mandate
to protect their citizenry and thereby reaffirm their own role in
the federal system.
grams. For example, a complaint was recently filed by the state of Missouri challenging
a Department of Transportation decision to allocate funds for the construction of a new
airport facility for the St. Louis area to an Illinois site. See Missouri ex rel. Missouri-St.
Louis Metropolitan Airport Auth. v. Coleman, No. 76-1683 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1976).
Plaintiffs asserted standing under the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1701, (1973) and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) and the equal protection clause. The state ex-
plicitly sought to represent "the overwhelming majority of people and air travelers in
the St. Louis area." Complaint at 3.
220 It should be noted that the allowance of state parens patriae suits against federal
administrative agencies would not invade the preeminence of federal authority nor in-
fringe the scope of discretion conferred upon those agencies. The state would have to
make out the elements of a statutory violation or other alleged illegality as would any
private litigant. Nor would the liability or remedy sought be altered by such suits.
